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Abstract
Sensor-driven systems provide data and information that facilitate real-time decision-making
and autonomous actuation, as well as enable informed policy choices. But can we be sure
these systems work as expected, can we model them in a way that captures all the key is-
sues? We define two concepts: frames of reference and frames of function that help us
organise models of sensor-based systems and their purpose. Examples from a smart water
distribution network illustrate how frames offer a lens through which to organise and balance
multiple views of the system. Frames aid communication between modellers, analysts and
stakeholders, and distinguish the purpose of each model, which contributes towards our trust
that the system fulfils its purpose.
Keywords: models; assurance; sensor-driven systems; sensor networks
1 Introduction
Sensor-driven systems are everywhere: from transportation and buildings, to smart tags,
power systems and environmental monitoring. They provide data and information that fa-
cilitate real-time decision-making and autonomous actuation, as well as enabling informed
policy choices by service providers and regulators. The Internet of Things depends on robust,
sensor-driven systems that can be trusted to deliver useful, correct, and timely information.
Our vision is of smarter sensor-based systems of which stakeholders – from developers to
scientists and policy makers – can ask deeper questions while being confident of obtaining
reliable answers. But can we be convinced that these systems do what we expect, can their
stakeholders ask deep questions and be confident of obtaining reliable answers? Are they
trustworthy with respect to their requirements? This is especially difficult to determine, for ex-
ample when systems need to balance competing demands such as sampling rates required
to answer a scientific question, timely actuation to ensure delivery of a service, and energy
conservation when operating with constrained resources.
Given the ubiquity of sensor-driven networked systems, it is perhaps surprising that ex-
tracting reliable information from them remains far from straightforward: sensors consume
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power, they are noisy, they decalibrate, may become misplaced, moved, compromised, and
generally degraded over time, both individually and as a collective. This is beyond traditional
software engineering: uncertainty, failures, power and communication constraints pervade
both the physical and digital environments in which these systems operate, and the sensors
themselves, and is even crucial to some of the adaptive algorithms employed. Furthermore,
sensors themselves are increasingly required to fulfil both housekeeping functions (reporting
to the sensor provider) and multiple sensing functions (reporting to multiple applications). The
sensor system may also be required to be smart, e.g. support, and exhibit increasing degrees
of autonomy, self-awareness, and intelligence. These systems are core to many technologies
intended to aid sustainability via smart cities, smart grids, smart farming etc. and yet their own
reliability and sustainability is not well understood. Can we guarantee that the system will do
what we expect, and therefore can we, in good conscience, make use of the information being
presented, and so trust the behaviour being exhibited? Without such assurances, no business
or organisation will deploy complex, semi-autonomous, adaptive sensor-driven systems; no
decision-maker will allow their decisions to rest on a possibly unstable foundation.
While we cannot engineer away issues such as uncertainty, failures, energy consumption
etc. fortunately, sensor-driven system architecture tends to be specialised and constrained,
usually, to an enhanced form of a sense and control loop. Thus while assurance is still
difficult, it is within the context of specialised concerns and architecture. It is our asser-
tion that a crucial tool for addressing trustworthiness is the use of models, both at design
time and run-time (e.g. online models): for specification; for explanation; and for explo-
ration and prediction. Our assertion derives from our experience of research and develop-
ment of a wide range of sensor-driven systems e.g. [Kartakis et al., 2015, Kamal et al., 2014,
Fang and Dobson, 2013, Fisher et al., 2013, Konur et al., 2014, Calder et al., 2015, Benford et al., 2016,
Ye et al., 2016, Jackson et al., 2017].
For any sensor-driven system, many models could be produced; we define two categori-
sations that are orthogonal yet overlapping, which help guide us. These two new concepts
contribute to a principled modelling process by helping us to frame models of sensor-based
systems and their purpose: frames of reference provide a way to organise and balance mul-
tiple perspectives and concerns, and frames of function identify component(s) within the sys-
tem architecture that are the focus of attention. Together, they offer a lens through which to
view and analyse the sensor-based system, which aids understanding of the purpose of that
model and communication between modellers, analysts, and stakeholders. This allows us to
distinguish and articulate the purpose of each model, contributing to our overall trust that the
system fulfils its purpose and requirements. Fig. 1 illustrates how different combinations of
the frames can allow the multiple dimensions of focus to be reduced to make analysis more
tractable, in terms the development of models based on the questions we wish to ask of the
system.
The following sections describe in more detail the two concepts that help us to frame
model purpose, questions and analysis. In the next section we review the motivation for
models and in Section 3 and Section 4 we define frames of reference and frames of function.
In 5 we discuss how and when to use frames in modelling and in Section 6 we illustrate
the new concepts by way of models for a smart water distribution network. We offer a short
discussion in Section 7 and related work is discussed in Section 8; conclusions are provided
in Section 9. It is important to note that this view provides an abstract methodology for design
and development. While this must be subsequently populated with concrete languages and
ontologies, these are typically very different for each scenario and so we will not expand on
these here.
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Figure 1: Frames of reference and function: a lens for modelling and analysis.
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2 Sensor-based systems and their models
The concerns of uncertainty, failures, energy etc. that are inherent in practical sensor-
based systems will always be present: these aspects cannot simply be engineered away and
subsequently ignored. Further, the purpose, or mission, of the system may involve a num-
ber of trade-offs and compromises. A simple example involves controlling the duty cycle of a
sensor node to preserve battery life. Efficient battery technology coupled with low-powered
micro-controllers and transceiver devices have been key to the uptake of wireless sensors
and now such systems can be placed in more remote and difficult to reach areas with minimal
infrastructure required. Yet batteries, from a sensor systems point of view, have become an
“Achilles heel” for the long term sustainability and operation of wireless sensor systems. It
is costly to replace batteries (and problematic if the sensors are inaccessible), they can be
dangerous (lithium can cause fires), contribute to waste, and generally have a negative en-
vironmental effect. Further, energy harvesting is not always a solution either since energy
storage is inherently inefficient and again storage cells last only for a short number of years
(think of mobile phone battery lifetimes). So, core to making sensor systems ‘green’ is energy
management that typically implies at least duty-cycling and possibly adaptive duty-cycling.
However, the latter might be constrained by a mission goal prescribing minimal sensing fre-
quency – or might even be disallowed entirely because of the need for extraction of a regular
time series. Without precisely-articulated requirements, it is impossible to know how this
trade-off can be made in a way that does not compromise the efficacy of the sensor-based
system. It is difficult to answer questions about energy source choice if we have not defined
our goals and we do not have a way to explore design alternatives and their impact. Often
such choices are implicit; formal models make them explicit, and thus amenable to analysis.
Models are at the core of enabling stakeholders to have the confidence they need to trust in
– and make decisions from – the information being returned from a sensor system.
Models are used extensively across science and engineering, providing insight into the
behaviours of what already exists, predicting future behaviours of what might exist, and ex-
ploring the implications of the specifications and designs of what we want to exist and how
and if they meet system requirements [Calder et al, 2018]. We do not repeat the arguments in
support of modelling here, but note that recent research in pervasive and cyber-physical sys-
tems that tackles modelling, implementation, and deployment of artificial systems integrated
within real-world environments, e.g. [Tsigkanos et al., 2017, Derler et al., 2012], is highly rele-
vant. We draw on this work, for example from pervasive systems [Coutaz et al., 2005], where
raw data from devices is processed as context, from which situations are inferred, and control
and adaptation then depends on those situations, and we draw on cyber-physical systems to
the extent to which they concentrate on the modelling and interaction of software with phys-
ical scenarios, typically using hybrid systems analysis and novel models of programming, as
advocated in [Derler et al., 2012].
In [Lee, 2015], Lee refers to cyber-physical systems as the “fundamental intellectual prob-
lem of conjoining the engineering traditions of the cyber and the physical worlds”; he also sees
models as being central to the study of such cyber-physical systems, noting that “software ab-
stractions were not created for cyber-physical systems. They were created to run payrolls”.
We agree: we do not yet have the best abstractions and concepts for sensor-driven systems.
Sensor systems dwell within other systems: water distribution systems, smart grid systems,
industrial control systems, environmental systems and all these envelop the sensor systems
impacting on them and being impacted by them. One concrete example is of a sensor de-
vice that uses vibrations to carry out condition monitoring of an engine; it is responsible for
interpreting the vibration and temperature signals and to quickly inform the actuator to slow
the operation of the engine when either the temperature or vibrations reach certain thresh-
old levels. This aims to maximise the lifetime of the engine, but revolution rates cannot fall
below the engine efficiency requirements. The sensor device uses a piezoelectric harvester
to obtain energy from the engine, yet when the vibrations lower the energy opportunity falls,
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and a dip in voltage can affect the sensor reading accuracy, cause clock drift etc. The sensor
node can provide guarantees that the energy levels are maintained, but is this at the cost of
engine longevity? What we have described here consists of many sub-systems, the cyber
computing context, the engine itself, its environment, the regulatory framework, etc. The na-
ture and complexity of such hierarchical systems means that no single model can effectively
cover everything. Therefore, we agree with other researchers investigating this subject that
no one model fits all, however there is a lack of research in articulating how we bring these
models together in a comprehensive yet tractable manner; this paper aims to addresses this
omission.
The problem we address is how, from a statement of system requirements and stake-
holder concerns, and an understanding of system architecture, we can derive both models
and questions for analysis, as well as interpreting the answers, to assure stakeholders. Work
in [Calder et al, 2018] reminds us of the importance of clarity aboutmodel purpose; and to be
clear about what a model is as what it is not. To that end frames improve the modelling and
analysis process by enabling us to organise models and analysis and the ways they contribute
to assuring system requirements and stakeholder concerns. Our goal is not a formally defined
process, rather we offer these concepts as an aid to, or framework for, model development.
3 Frames of reference
Stakeholders often have very different (possibly competing) perspectives on the key ab-
stractions and assumptions about a sensor-based system. For example developers may be
focussed on the constraints (e.g. energy consumption) whereas users may be focussed on the
services provided. Furthermore, the physical and digital environments in which sensor-based
systems operate are inherently complex, and so it can be difficult to see how the different
perspectives can be managed effectively. We define a frame of reference as a context in
which measurements, judgements and interpretations can be made. Each frame articulates a
different perspective and the dimensions and measurements specific to that perspective. Our
definition aligns with standard dictionary definitions such as a set of criteria or stated values
in relation to which measurements or judgements can be made; the overall context in which
a problem or situation is placed, viewed, or interpreted; the observer interprets what he sees
in terms of his own cultural frame of reference; we refine the concept further by enumerating
the following frames relevant to sensor-driven systems.
• Geographic: spatial and topological relationships between sensors. Typically these
may be static networks (e.g. because the sensors are fixed to lampposts or in the
ground), or dynamic networks (e.g. because they are fixed to mobile people, animals
or objects), or on a fluid surface or within a flow in a pipeline. There may be many
such relationships, one of which may be the data communication between sensors and
controller(s), e.g. in star topology, peer to peer, etc.
• Physical: aspects of the environment in which sensors operate, be it physical or digital,
which may affect system behaviours, e.g. physical aspects such as temperature, wind
speed, may affect degradation of devices and other system components.
• Failures: relationships between the components that can fail, degrade, or operate in-
correctly, including fail-safe mechanisms and redundancies.
• Economic: quantitative aspects of resources and their consumption, production and
discovery. Example resources include energy, money, and digital data; typical mea-
surements include maintenance costs, constraints on data buffers and communication
bandwidth.
• Legal: deontic concepts such as obligations, permissions and responsibilities for differ-
ent system components and human users.
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• Security: vulnerabilities, threats and their mitigations, such as access controls pre-
venting unauthorised entry to a system and encryption methods that encode data so
it can only be accessed via keys. These vulnerabilities include those presented by
multi-tenant architectures and the spatial factors of access, for example close-proximity,
remote-proximity.
• Privacy: anonymity, identity, authentication of personally identifiable information, and
controls on intended and unintended disclosures.
• Social: communication and interaction between humans involved in the system, and
between humans, the physical/natural world, and the underlying technologies. Usability
and cognitive dissonance are key concepts. For example, GPS drift can cause cognitive
dissonance and lack of trust in a system when a user believes they are stationary yet
their GPS coordinates are fluctuating.
• Uncertainty: what are the acceptable bounds of uncertainty for various aspects of the
system, and how are the bounds qualified, quantified, and related to each other.
• Temporal: aspects of timing and computation paths that are relevant to system purpose,
from simple temporal orderings to hard real-time constraints, as well also expected cer-
tainty of the model over time. For example weather forecasting becomes less certain
the further we look into the future, and navigation models become less precise as we
move away from the position where we last verified a location.
We now turn our attention to the question of sensor-rich systems architectures.
4 Frames of function
Fig 2 illustrates a typical system software architecture in a smart, sensor-based system:
the functional components and data flows. Components may relate directly to physical entities
(e.g. devices) or be conceptual (e.g. situation, control). On the left, we have a standard
sense and control loop, whereas on the right we have network communication, semantic and
adaptive/autonomous capabilities, and above we have the physical/digital environment and
human users. We define a frame of function as a component within this architecture, which
we describe as follows. (In simple systems, some of these components may not be present. )
• Devices: interact directly with the environment, for sensing and actuation, they may
also have a housekeeping role. Raw data from devices are processed as context, from
which situations are inferred; control and strategies (and possibly adaptation) depend
on those situations. There may be impacts of the physical environment on devices,
e.g. degradation due to wear and tear, or effect of temperature on performance.
• Context: refers to how raw signals from devices are processed into reusable computer
data. This is typically a syntactic transformation that may, for example, include data
smoothing, outlier rejection, and the extraction and maintenance of confidence intervals.
We often refer to data that has been processed in this way as cleaned data.
• Control: embodies the purpose of the system through control of individual devices and
the network. For example, control may include powering down individual devices for
periods of time, or changing communication rates.
• Network: specifies how and when devices interact with each other, and with the appli-
cation (through control). System data refers to operational data such as network status.
Communications protocols are fundamental and usually depend on properties of the
underlying sensor topology, e.g. star topology, peer to peer, and properties such as
requirements for consistency between adjacent sensors; these properties may be dy-
namic. Sensor topologies may be modelled by metric or topological spaces. Models
may also include representation of the impact of the physical environment on sets of
devices and/or communications links.
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Figure 2: Typical sensor-driven system architecture: functional components and data flows.
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• Situation: refers to how data is interpreted semantically from context, typically by an
inference process [Ye et al., 2012] that is implemented in software. For example, a data
item might be classified as a known or a previously undetected event, or for a given time
series, an inference process may infer semantic quantities such as “getting hotter” or
“approaching a dangerous level”.
• Strategies: are how the software uses self-reflection (e.g. adaptation, autonomy) to
achieve its mission and purpose, including node-level, network-level and application-
level adaptations. Strategies may be tailored to the behavioural envelopes for individual
nodes and ensembles. Behavioural envelopes can change, usually triggered by situ-
ation changes, and adaptation means that devices may be updated, enhanced or re-
configured. There is usually a close relationship between control and strategies, control
typically depending on a mixture of strategies and (cleaned) data.
• Environment: includes the laws and problem descriptions of aspects of the environ-
ment, be it physical or digital, which affect the function and purpose of the system.
These come from natural science, engineering, regulations, and so on. For example,
this might include analytical models such as differential equations, or statistical distribu-
tions, simulations, and specifications of safe and unsafe thresholds.
• Users: if human users are involved in the system and interactingwith devices (e.g. wear-
ing sensors) their behaviour can be considered as part of the environment. Alternatively,
we may require more explicit consideration of relevant aspects of their behaviour. For
example, this might include interactions between users and devices, or interactions be-
tween users, based, for example, on proxemics – theories of how people use interper-
sonal distance to understand and mediate interactions with others [S. et al., 2011].
5 How and when to use frames
We propose a pragmatic, semi-structured process for employing frames, based on plain
text. Clarity about what is in scope, as well as what is not, can help us to focus on the purpose
of each model and analysis, and identify any gaps we have overlooked. We have deliberately
chosen not to define a formal meta-level framework for modelling: our experience tells us that
what is required most urgently is clarity about the purpose and dimensions of a model, rather
than another formal framework that is only used by a small community of experts. We make
no assumption about the type of model, e.g. continuous, discrete, stochastic, state-based,
event-based, logic-based, agent-based etc., but do assume there are established techniques
and tools for formal analysis. The following is a guide to using frames.
Frames are used when
• selecting the modelling formalism and developing a model,
• selecting questions that can be asked of the model and encoding those questions using
the analysis techniques for that formalism,
• interpreting and communicating answers from model analysis to stakeholders,
• documenting a model for possible future re-use and/or certification,
• reviewing model coverage: identifying and explaining gaps in a set of models, for exam-
ple which frames of reference/function are missing and why.
The selection and combination of frames (reference and function) for each model involves
discussion between modellers, analysts, and systems developers. While the primary focus
may be a particular set of frames, a model may need to have abstract representations or
requirements derived from one set of frames, in order to represent and analyse in more detail
another set. For example, we may require representations about uncertainty of devices and
their control, in order to model uncertainty in the network communications.
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6 Modelling with frames: examples from a smart wa-
ter distribution network
The following example is taken from our experience of working with smart water distribution
networks that monitor and control pumping, valves, and communication. In these systems,
treated water must be kept moving at sufficient hydraulic pressure to maintain the treatment,
yet should not put undue pressure on the pipes. Pumping treated water reservoirs to supply
zones and storage tanks consumes most of the energy budget for a utility. Smart use of tanks
and reservoirs, and shifting pumping schedules to cheap tariff periods, can result in savings
and so impact how water systems remain sustainable.
The purpose of a smart water distribution network is to minimise pumping costs, min-
imise pipe degradation and leakage, and satisfy customer demands over water pressure and
quality. The systems includes water reservoir(s), water tanks, flow meters, pressure sensors,
motorised valves, and pump(s). Data communication – between nodes (sensors) and pump,
and from pump to valve – may be subject to transmission delays and bandwidth constraints.
Typical stakeholder questions include: what is lowest pressure that can meet demand
and keep water clean; what is the highest pressure that minimises pipe damage; what is the
minimal data rate that meets legal requirements for reporting leaks; under the assumption
of no failures, does the proposed pumping schedule meet customer demand over a 48 hour
period; how resource usage be reduced , e.g. energy, in delivering water sustainably, given
changing environmental conditions?
Modelling this type of system is challenging because we have continuous behaviour of fluid
flows and motorised valves (devices), stochastic behaviour of digital communication (network)
and pipe degradation, and discrete behaviour of control software. There are periodic and
aperiodic events. Note there are no human users nor personal (e.g. billing) data in the system.
We describe informally below four models that are under development based on Water-
box – an experimental platform [Kartakis et al., 2015] developed at Imperial College. We list
the primary frames, the modelling and analysis techniques. Details of these models will be
reported in further technical papers.
6.1 Dynamics of fluids and tolerances
Frames of reference: Physical, Geographic, Temporal
Frames of function: Control, Environment
This model represents the dynamics of fluids and physical control with differential equa-
tions based on control theory; embedded in them is the relevant physics of the physical water
system (hydraulics etc.). In the cyber-physical systems (CPS) community this would be de-
scribed as representing the physical model. The purpose of this continuous model is to in-
vestigate under what circumstances the system control ensures the overall system meets the
requirements of customer demand and there are no overflows. Delays in control signals can
be as detrimental to the system converging as not being able to detect the state of the water
system. The impact of delays (from communications or other sources) has to analysed, for
each particular controller design. Specifically, the purpose of each of these models (for each
controller design) is to determine control tolerances: what are the maximum message delays
and message loss that can occur and the system still fulfil requirements of customer demand
with no overflows, for how long is this maintained, and what is the degree of disturbance that
can be tolerated. Within these frames we are not interested in the causes of delays: it is not
important whether this is caused by node failure, bandwidth issues or packet loss. However,
the number of devices reporting to a centralised controller can delay its calculations therefore
the processing capacity of the controller is very relevant. Considering the Temporal frame of
reference, there would not be many changes in the models over time – except where the wa-
ter network itself is expanded or trends in demand change due to, for example, a new hospital
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being built that would cause a impactive change in demand calculations and therefore control
schemes. Analysis of the equations is by simulations, and typically uses standard control
systems development tools such as Simulink [Simulink, ].
6.2 Impact of data communications
Frames of reference: Economic, Uncertainty, Failures
Frames of function: Network, Devices
Here, the resource in the Economic frame is data; the stochastic behaviours in the Un-
certainty frame arise from packet loss and delay. The purpose of this model is to investigate
different protocols and data routing algorithms for data communication in the network, the
different ways to deal with the bandwidth and device data buffer constraints, and when/how
individual devices contribute to delays of packets. We assume we have already determined
the tolerances of the control function, namely maximum message delays and message loss
that the control function can tolerate and still fulfil requirements of customer demand and
no overflows etc., in the model above (Section 6.1). Most control systems utilise a TDMA
style MAC protocol (as opposed to CSMA and multi-hop approaches), because of the tight
timing orchestrations that ensure when a node sends is more deterministic and therefore
packet reception times are more predictable. We examine the use of LoRa, a standard low-
powered wide-area communications to relay data to the base-station; LoRaWan (its MAC)
can provide guarantees of sensor data deliveries due to its scheduled TDMA nature. We can
describe this as the “cyber” side of the CPS equation, and we can model this with a probabilis-
tic discrete space model. We use probabilistic temporal logic properties to express whether
the tolerances of message delays and loss will always (or sometimes, and under which cir-
cumstances) be met, and use the model-checker PRISM [Kwiatkowska et al., 2011], to prove
them, or if not, to indicate the circumstances under which they fail to be met.
6.3 Energy consumption
Frames of reference: Economic, Geographic
Frames of function: Network and Strategies
Here, the resource in the Economic frame is energy and the aim is to show (or not) that the
battery operational lifetime lasts greater or equal to two years (to minimise the maintenance
costs of the sensor network), and at the same time the quality of the data is maintained such
that the there is at least one data reading available every 15 minutes. We assume that the net-
work uses low-powered wide-area communications to relay data in a star topology to a single
base-station (Geographic frame of reference). Compressive sensing techniques are used to
adapt the sensing rate down when data values indicate that the next sensor reading is not nec-
essary (this technique can interpret data trends and predict that, for example, temperature will
not change more than a degree in the next time slice), which is examined under the Strategies
frame of function. The model is again probabilistic discrete state, but in this case the focus
is not on the probabilities per se but on the rewards (i.e. costs) that are associated with both
states and transitions. Rewards are a feature of the PRISM [Kwiatkowska et al., 2011] model
checker, which is used to examine reward based temporal properties that express assurances
about battery lifetime, while meeting data sampling requirements. Note that to offer stronger
assurance, we may in future add the Situation frame of reference and make inferences about
energy consumption over sets of observed traces over time, and use these to fine-tune the
rewards.
6.4 Detecting security attacks
Frames of reference: Security
Frames of function: Context, Situation
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Finally, we consider how two types of Security attack on the communications network im-
pact the control operation. Jammed communication acts as a delay and spoofing can inject
false data. In both cases the result is incorrect system (state) and semantic data that causes
system to function incorrectly. For example, these attacks can cause pipe bursts due to con-
stant actuation causing water pressure hammers, or can allow water to overflow reservoirs.
We examine (cleaned) sensed data and system in the Context and Situation frames, using
machine learning, to detect “abnormal” sensing and networks communications. We can in-
fer stochastic models of clusters of “normal” behaviour and variances from sampled event
streams, consisting of both periodic data sensing events and aperiodic control events. We
then use the models at runtime, as online monitors to detect ”abnormal” sensing communica-
tion, by comparing the observed data streams from the system with the expected streams.
6.5 Model coverage
The simple tables in Figures 3a and 3b summarise the frames employed in the four models
above: 1 refers to model in Section 6.1, etc. Frames label the rows: frames of reference are
on the left, frames of function are on the right. An entry indicates the frame was used in that
model, e.g. Geographic frame of reference was employed in models 1 and 3, the Environment
frame of function was employed in model 1. The Social and Privacy frames of reference are
omitted as they are not relevant to this system. We do not expect a uniform distribution of
frames and it is not surprising that the Geographic and Economic frames of reference and
Network frame of function are addressed in more than one model – these are key frames for
this system. We can see quickly that we have not addressed the Legal frame of reference.
This is deliberate, for this system, because burst detection is straightforward (e.g. from flows)
and sub-second notification is not required.
Frame of reference model
Geographic 1, 3
Physical 1
Economic 2, 3
Security 4
Uncertainty 2
Temporal 1
Failures 2
Legal –
(a) Frames of reference.
Frame of function model
Environment 1
Device 2
Context 4
Control 1
Network 2, 3
Situation 4
Strategies 3
(b) Frames of function.
Figure 3: Frames of reference (left) and function (right) employed in models 1–4.
7 Discussion
The variety of models required for this one system demonstrates the breadth and com-
plexity of sensor-driven networked systems and their requirements. In this case no single
model would be tractable, or comprehensible: each model has a purpose and analysis of
that model contributes to our overall understanding and trust that the system fulfils its require-
ments. Frames help us to distinguish and articulate the purpose of each model, and also to
articulate the absence of a model.
We recognise that models are just one, albeit important, component of assurance of
sensor-driven systems: modelling and analysis needs to be coupled with software devel-
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opment, testing and analysis of actual deployments. While techniques for context and situa-
tion recognition and inference have, and are, being researched extensively, especially in the
context of “big data”, we suggest there are several new challenges specific to sensor-based
system modelling. For example:
• How can historical data be used to calibrate models that have not been inferred from
data, for the analysis of system play-back, and also to aid predictions of future system
behaviour?
• How can we use model predictions as inputs to control, and use sensed contexts and
situations to calibrate model predictions? For example, can we use model predictions to
modify system goals, to drive sensor change, and detect data anomalies?
• Over time, context and situations that have been observed and inferred may be com-
pared with those predicted by standard models based on laws of physics, e.g. observed
(sensed) water levels are compared with predicted water levels. But we may find that
the observed levels are not as predicted. How should we modify the (possibly long
established) physics models when they do not align with actual sensed data?
• What can we learn from sensor-driven systems that fail, as well as succeed? Too often,
only successful applications are recorded. What is the role of modelling in failed sys-
tems? A good example of a failed application is the remarkably honest assessment of a
150 wireless sensor node application for precision agriculture reported in [Langendoen et al., 2006].
A culture of reporting failures, and analyses thereof (e.g. the recent FAILSAFEworkshop
[fai, ]) will only strengthen the role for improved modelling and also for sensor-driven sys-
tems.
8 Related work
The problem of identifying and dealing with multiple perspectives, or views, of a system,
particularly during software development, is well known in software engineering. We attempt
here to situate our work in that context, noting that we do not give a comprehensive literature
review, but rather select key related work.
Nearly thirty years ago Somerville introduced viewpoint analysis [Sommerville, 1992], where
a viewpoint is defined informally as a “way of looking at the system”. Viewpoints are very wide
ranging: there may be tens or hundreds of viewpoints for a system, the exact number and
nature depends on the system. There is some categorisation, e.g. there are functional view-
points and non-functional viewpoints. Very loosely, we can say that our frames of function
correspond to the former and our frames of reference to the latter. Further comparison is diffi-
cult because Sommervilles viewpoints cover all the breadth (and depth) of software systems;
we are concerned with a specific domain (sensor-driven systems), and so we can be much
more prescriptive about our frames.
Subsequent research on views has been more rigorous, such as contract-based design
andmultiple viewpoints [von Hanxleden et al., 2012, Hennicker and Ludwig, 2012, Benveniste et al., 2007],
which aim to support distributed design of different aspects of the system; the key results are
generic mathematical models that formalise contract theories and meta-theories. We have
deliberately chosen not to formalise processes, e.g. how to integrate models, nor to introduce
new modelling techniques, rather our aim has been a pragmatic, semi-structured process to
improve model development and interpretation and communication of results.
Several researchers have recognised the difficult problem of framing, for example problem
frames [Jackson, 2001] and experimental frames [Zeigler, 1976, Daum and Sargent, 2001].
The former presents a set of concepts to be used when gathering requirements and creating
specifications for software, these include specific frames of required behaviour, commanded
behaviour, information display, etc. Again, while these are useful in the context of general
software development, they are focussed on requirements and design, and dont meet our
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specific needs of articulating model purpose for sensor-driven systems that operate in a
cyber-physical world. The latter is defined specifically for discrete event simulation models
and addresses the problem of characterising a set(s) of circumstances under which a model
is to be observed or experimented with. This includes specifying the mean rate of arrivals,
seeds for the random number generators etc. This provides a useful, but narrow lens with
which to view models, and apart from assuming the model is event based, it disregards any
domain specific aspects such as what the events represent. We expect experimental circum-
stances to be part of the dimensions of a frame, or pair of (reference and function) frames.
For example, rates of communication bandwidth would be specified within the economic and
network frames, rates of sensor failures within the failure and device frames, and message
loss rates within the failures and network frames. Finally, there are few explicit concepts for
modelling sensor-driven systems, apart from those we mentioned earlier for pervasive com-
puting and cyber-security, though we note that [Tsigkanos et al., 2017] classifies properties
as local spatial (entities are in pre-defined structural patterns), global spatial (entities are ar-
bitrarily distributed in space), and temporal, which loosely correspond to our geographic and
temporal frames of reference.
Can our concepts add new insights into existing models of sensor-based systems? For ex-
ample, the Ptides and Ptolemy models described in [Derler et al., 2012] and [Lee, 2015] refer
to interplays between physical models (i.e. Environment), sensors, actuators (i.e. Devices),
computation (i.e. Control), and Network communication. The Failures and Temporal frames
of reference are predominant, with an emphasis on timing and scheduling. Additionally, in
[Derler et al., 2012] a modal, hybrid model in Ptolemy II is proposed for improved adaptation,
we would classify this as focussing on the Strategies frame. Future work could determine
how our frames help with modifications to these systems and/or how the models could be
extended to incorporate assurance over other frames of reference.
9 Conclusions
Sensor-driven systems will become increasingly significant over the coming decades, sup-
porting evidence-based decision-making in the face of global challenges such as environmen-
tal change, food production, internet of things and autonomous vehicles. But progress will be
undermined by our inability to assure both decision-makers and users of the integrity and
timeliness of the information being provided and the decisions taken. Without such assur-
ance, increasingly “smart” infrastructures will become unpredictable and unacceptable, and
the ability of state, scientific, and industrial actors to leverage the benefits of sensing and
autonomy will be severely restricted.
Modelling is a crucial part of establishing trust, and models are applicable not only at
design time, but also during deployment, as a system is running. We have introduced two new
concepts: frames of reference and frames of function, which provide an abstract methodology
for design and and development. They improve the modelling and analysis process by helping
us to distinguish and articulate the purpose of each model, which in turn helps us to deal with,
communicate, and assure stakeholders about the competing demands of understanding the
sensed world, the computation, communication, and self-reflection within a sensor based
system, and the ways in which the devices interact with sensed world.
We have outlined how these concepts are being employed in an example system we are
working on; demonstration of the full benefits of these models is the focus of further technical
papers. Future work will include further demonstration and development of frames of refer-
ence and function, including the concrete languages and ontologies needed, through case
studies. The case studies will be based on increasingly complex end-user applications that
cover a wide range of frames and include sensor-driven systems that fail, as well as succeed.
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